Governance of Canadian and American Ports by Border Policy Research Institute
Western Washington University
Western CEDAR
Border Policy Research Institute Publications Border Policy Research Institute
2006
Governance of Canadian and American Ports
Border Policy Research Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/bpri_publications
Part of the Economics Commons, Geography Commons, International and Area Studies
Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Border Policy Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Border Policy Research Institute at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Border Policy Research Institute Publications by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact
westerncedar@wwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Border Policy Research Institute, "Governance of Canadian and American Ports" (2006). Border Policy Research Institute Publications.
51.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/bpri_publications/51
  BORDER  POLICY BRIEF  
   Focus:  Governance of Canadian and American Ports 
Introduction.  This article discusses differences in the 
governance of seaports within the U.S. and Canada, with par-
ticular emphasis upon ports located on the Georgia Basin –
Puget Sound waterway shared by the State of Washington and 
the Province of British Columbia.  The article reveals how 
regulatory contexts affect the ability of ports to compete 
within and outside the region and concludes with an assess-
ment of the advantages of regional port cooperation. 
Three globally significant ports are located on the Georgia 
Basin – Puget Sound:  the ports of Tacoma and Seattle, sepa-
rately operated by two Washington State port authorities, and 
the port of Vancouver, in British Columbia.  Table 1 shows 
the utilization of the three for container traffic, relative to 
other ports in North America.  The three ports compete for 
Asian trade with each other and with North America’s largest 
container ports, Los Angeles and Long Beach.  The competi-
tion takes place not only at the broadest global levels, as ship-
ping firms calculate their most advantageous routes, but also at 
the local level.  As the ports race to expand and upgrade their 
facilities, located in each case in thriving urban areas, competi-
tion is affected by funding sources and public reactions to such 
spillover effects as noise, pollution, and land conversion for 
infrastructure and warehouses.  As public-private enterprises, 
ports receive public funding and therefore are required to be 
accountable to the public, not just to their private clients.  Port 
authorities must, of necessity, think globally and act locally. 
Roles of a Port.  The importance of governance to port 
competitiveness becomes clear upon considering a deceptively 
simple question:  “What is a port?”  The prime definition of a 
port is to serve as a link in the transportation chain.  In addi-
tion to moving cargo onshore and offshore, ports must pro-
vide for the efficient movement of cargo between transporta-
tion modes.  This “intermodal” connection generally involves 
the movement of cargo from ships to railroads or trucks, 
which may take the cargo to its ultimate destination or to a 
warehouse for storage until the ultimate user requires the 
goods.  Based on this definition alone, it would make sense for 
the ports of Seattle, Tacoma, and Vancouver to coordinate 
their activities in order to ensure adequate infrastructure, create 
a rational cargo-handling system, and compete most effectively 
with other West Coast ports.   
A second definition of ports focuses on their economic 
role.  Ports are engines of regional economic development, as 
is often emphasized by the ports themselves.  All three Puget 
Sound ports periodically release economic impact studies com-
piling their local, regional, and even national value.  In 2005 
the port of Vancouver created 30,100 direct jobs, generated by 
five port-related sectors:  maritime cargo, cruise industry, capi-
tal investment in port facilities, shipbuilding and repair, and 
non-maritime enterprises.  Federal, provincial, and local taxes 
and revenues generated in the year 2004 were estimated at ap-
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proximately $763 million, including payments by the Vancou-
ver Port Authority itself, by employers and employees in all 
five of the port’s employment sectors, and by cruise ship pas-
sengers.1  The port of Tacoma reported creation of 10,978 full-
time jobs in 2005,2  while a 2003 port of Seattle report esti-
mated that Seattle’s seaport generates 17,927 direct jobs.3  Sea-
port activity at Tacoma and Seattle is estimated to generate 
$107.5 million and $210.9 million, respectively, in state and 
local tax revenue.   
These economic benefits, plus the indirect benefits ac-
crued through more broadly defined port-related activities, 
motivate the ports to compete with each other for shippers’ 
business.  Port users, especially shipping companies, are the 
targets of such competition, and ports compete by offering 
faster turnaround times, more and larger facilities for carriers, 
and lower costs. 
Ports are not solely business enterprises, however.  They 
are hybrids which allow private enterprise to occur within a 
public framework.  A third definition of ports, therefore, is 
that they are government agencies defined by law.  As such, 
U.S. and Canadian laws establish different ground rules on 
each side of the border, thereby affecting the competition be-
tween the port of Vancouver and the ports of Seattle and Ta-
coma.  While the transportation and economic requirements of 
ports do not vary considerably across the international border, 
the legal and political contexts in which the ports function are 
very different.  
U.S. Port Governance:  Local Control.  In the post-
9/11 world, Americans have started to think of ports as a part 
of our national infrastructure that should be regulated by the 
federal government.  Because the Constitution gives the fed-
eral government authority over harbors and over foreign com-
merce, it would be logical to assume that the federal govern-
Table 1.  Ranking of North American Ports by 
Container Traffic, 2005 
  TEUs 
Los Angeles, CA 7,484,624 
Long Beach, CA 6,709,818 
New York, NY 4,792,922 
Oakland, CA 2,272,525 
Seattle, WA 2,087,929 
Tacoma, WA 2,066,447 
Charleston, SC 1,986,586 
Hampton Roads, VA 1,981,955 
Savannah, GA 1,901,520 
Vancouver, BC 1,767,379 
Source:  American Association of Port Authorities.  TEU 
stands for “twenty-foot equivalent unit,” a standard container 
measurement.  A 40-foot container is 2 TEUs. 
thorities are municipal corporations classified as “special dis-
tricts,” a category which also includes school districts, fire dis-
tricts, emergency medical districts, and approximately seventy 
other categories in Washington.  State law grants ports a wide 
range of powers, including the “acquisition, construction, 
maintenance, operation, development and regulation within 
the district” of improvements and facilities.  Ports are specifi-
cally authorized to engage in economic and industrial develop-
ment projects.  Ports may exercise eminent domain to acquire 
property, construct and operate sewer and water utilities, issue 
tax-exempt bonds, and even levy taxes – a power envied by 
Canadian ports.  A port may levy up to 45 cents per $1,000 of 
assessed valuation on all property within its district bounds for 
general port purposes.   In 2006, the port of Tacoma levied 
18.59 cents per $1,000 of assessed value, 
estimated to result in a total collection of 
$11.9 million.9  The port of Seattle’s 2006 
rate was 23.4 cents per $1,000 of assessed 
value, yielding a projected collection of 
$62.7 million.10  The ports control some of 
the most valuable property in the two cit-
ies, including 1,400 waterfront acres in 
Seattle.   
      A port district is formed by referen-
dum, and the voters also elect commis-
sioners to administer the districts and 
oversee their development and operation.  
Port commissions have many of the pow-
ers of a city council.  In Seattle, for exam-
ple, the port commission is a part-time, 
five-member panel, with a two-person 
staff.  The day-to-day work is done by the 
port’s professional staff of 1,600 and its 
CEO, referred to by one journalist as “one 
of the most powerful men in Seattle.”11   
Port authorities were among the earliest 
special districts to be established in Wash-
ington, which adopted legislation in 1911 to allow for their 
creation.  Government of ports by special district was intended 
to prevent control by private monopolies and to give “the peo-
ple” power over public commerce.  In 1911, the port of Seattle 
became the first autonomous municipal corporation in the 
nation to engage in port terminal operation and commerce 
development.12  The port of Tacoma was formed seven years 
later.  Although it seems odd that two ports only thirty miles 
apart should function independently, much less compete with 
each other, each port is an independent local government, an-
swerable only to its own commission and home-county voters. 
Canadian Port Governance:  Gradual Devolution of a 
Top-Down System.  Compared to American ports, Canadian 
ports are top-down entities.  Canada’s constitution, the British 
North America Act of 1867, placed navigation and shipping 
under the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction.  In 1936, 
the government created the National Harbours Board, which 
attempted to implement a centralized command and control 
system, including a central set of port charges.  Port admini-
stration nonetheless became fragmented, with ports operating 
under different laws and agencies.  Reform in the 1970s, led by 
the Canada Ports Corporation Act, established Local Port Cor-
ment controls ports.  In fact, state and local governments are 
the primary operators and regulators of ports, with the result 
that port planning and investment decisions are largely decen-
tralized.  The federal government does play a role, but its func-
tions are diffuse and largely uncoordinated. 
The U.S. has no national port authority or port policy, and 
many commentators and government agencies have expressed 
concern over the absence of a strategy for the marine trans-
portation system that would take into account the needs of 
ports, waterways, and intermodal connections.  A new cabinet 
level Committee on the Marine Transportation System 
(CMTS) is intended to provide a more holistic approach to 
marine transportation, although its makeup demonstrates the 
fragmentation of federal agency control in this area.  The four 
“core agencies” of the CMTS are each lo-
cated within a different department of the 
federal government: the Maritime Admini-
stration, within the Department of Trans-
portation, tasked with promoting “the de-
velopment and maintenance of an ade-
quate, well-balanced United States mer-
chant marine”; the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, within the 
Department of Commerce, which provides 
oceanographic and meteorological data to 
ports and is also charged with protection 
of marine species subject to the Endan-
gered Species Act; the U.S. Coast Guard, 
the federal lead agency for maritime secu-
rity, now within the Department of Home-
land Security; and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, primarily associated with port 
dredging and channel improvement, but 
also the lead agency for regulating wetland 
development.   
Federal agencies thus are involved in 
the navigational, commercial, environ-
mental, and security interests of ports.  The federal govern-
ment also helps to fund ports.  Federal expenditures for the 
commercial marine transportation system as a whole, including 
ports, waterways, and intermodal connections, averaged $3.9 
billion per year between 1999 and 2001.  This funding went to 
13 federal agencies, with the largest expenditures by the Army 
Corps of Engineers for its dredging and harbor activities, fol-
lowed by the Coast Guard.4  Unlike federal expenditures on 
highways (approximately $25 billion per year) and aviation 
($10 billion per year), which are primarily supported by user 
assessments, most federal funding for marine transportation is 
drawn from the general fund.   
The main seaport-related user fee is the Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax (HMT), a 0.125% ad valorem fee on imports 
unloaded in deep water harbors.5  The HMT is deposited in 
the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, most of which is used to 
recover Corps of Engineers dredging costs.6  In 2002, it was 
estimated that the HMT averaged around $125 per import 
container in the ports of Seattle and Tacoma.7   
Although federal law and agencies clearly affect port op-
erations, Washington state law, not federal law, defines and 
governs the port authorities of Seattle and Tacoma.8  Port au-
Port of Seattle, courtesy NOAA 
2 
porations for the larger ports.  This was not a complete devo-
lution of control, however, as the Boards of Directors for 
these ports were appointed by the federal Minister of Trans-
port and the ports’ budgets were approved by Ottawa.13   
Continuing concerns over port efficiency and competitive-
ness prompted the federal government in 1995 to conduct 
cross-country hearings to provide input and generate recom-
mendations for a national marine policy.  This led to the adop-
tion of ports’ current governing law, the Canada Marine Act, 
effective in 1999.14 
While the Canada Marine Act allows Canadian ports 
greater local autonomy than the previous system, it still classi-
fies port authorities as “agent[s] of Her Majesty in right of 
Canada”15 and limits their activities to “port activities related to 
shipping, navigation, transportation of passengers and goods, 
handling of goods and storage of goods.”16  Economic devel-
opment activities and non-seaport activities, such as the port 
of Seattle’s operation of SeaTac Airport, are not within the 
purview of Canadian ports. 
The Canada Marine Act classifies Vancouver and 17 other 
major ports as Canadian Port Authorities, or CPAs.   For each 
CPA, the federal government negotiated “Letters Patent,” 
which have been described as the ports’ articles of incorpora-
tion.  The port of Vancouver’s Letters Patent specify:17 
• The makeup of the Board of Directors:  nine Directors; 
six appointed by the federal government, one by the prov-
ince of British Columbia, one by the provinces of Alberta 
and Manitoba, and one by port area municipalities;  
• An annual “Gross Revenue Charge” to be paid to the fed-
eral government, based on percentages of gross revenue; 
• A detailed legal description of the federal property under 
port jurisdiction; any changes in property ownership must 
be processed through Ottawa, through Supplementary 
Letters Patent; and 
• A cap on borrowing. 
Perceptions of Subsidization.  Both Canadians and 
Americans perceive that the ports on the opposite side of the 
border operate with unfair advantages. 
Because Tacoma and Seattle are deep water ports that usu-
ally do not require dredging to keep the waterways clear, the 
HMT is perceived in Washington as a tax that gives Vancouver 
a cost advantage while providing little in return.  Executives of 
both ports have testified before congressional committees that 
the port of Vancouver has gained business as a result of the 
HMT.  Earlier this year, for example, the CEO of the port of 
Seattle stated that the HMT is “being touted by Vancouver, 
BC officials as a reason for shipping lines to use the Canadian 
port instead of either the Ports of Seattle or Tacoma.”18  Based 
on the $125-per-import-container estimate cited earlier, the 
HMT results in a cost of over $200 million per year to custom-
ers of the ports of Seattle and Tacoma. 
Canadians perceive Seattle and Tacoma ports as benefiting 
from unfair advantages because of their relative freedom from 
restrictions imposed at the federal level.  The 2005 British Co-
lumbia Ports Strategy characterizes U.S. ports as having “ready 
access to local government financing,” being able to “raise 
taxes for port development,” getting “direct federal invest-
ment,” having the authority to issue “tax-exempt municipal 
bond financing,” and benefiting from “federal government 
investing in port security.”  B.C. ports, in contrast, have 
“different property tax regimes,” “pay stipends to federal gov-
ernment,” “no federal investment,” “taxable market debt fi-
nancing,” and “limited federal investment in port security.”19   
A 2004 study in Canadian Ports Magazine concluded that, 
“[c]onverted from US to Canadian dollars, the ports of Seattle 
and Tacoma, for example, received $53.6 million and $11.1 
million respectively annually as a result of their tax levies in 
their counties.”  In contrast, the article noted, the Vancouver 
Port Authority made “payments in lieu of taxes” (PILT) of $5 
million to surrounding municipalities. “Revenues collected 
from port tenants must fund this payment, putting the port at 
a competitive disadvantage.”  Comparing property taxation 
levels between Seattle and Tacoma tenants and those in Van-
couver, the article found that, converted from US to Canadian 
dollars, tenants at the ports of Seattle and Tacoma paid 
$20,000 and $4,000 per acre respectively, while the Port of 
Vancouver’s tenants paid $40,000 per acre in property taxes. 
Therefore, “port tenants in Vancouver suffer a direct competi-
tive disadvantage because of taxes as well as the indirect bur-
den of the Vancouver Port Authority’s property tax pay-
ments.”  The article concluded, “Many in the port community 
are waiting to see what, if anything, will be done to put Can-
ada’s major ports on a level playing field with competitors in 
the United States.”20 
In summary, ports in Washington claim that Vancouver 
has an unfair advantage because it does not have to charge the 
HMT.  The Vancouver Port Authority claims that Washington 
ports have an unfair advantage because of their tax and finance 
structure.  Neither set of contenders, of course, mentions the 
other side’s concerns or concedes any advantages to its side. 
Conclusion:  A Time for Regional Cooperation?  In 
their very different ways, ports in the U.S. and Canada reflect 
the turn of the nineteenth century rather than the start of the 
twenty-first century.  The classification of ports as “special 
districts” in Washington, governed by part-time elected 
boards, occurred at a time when ports were more local in scale, 
not the behemoth operations of today.  The effort to maintain 
central control over ports in Canada harkens back to a time 
when such control seemed possible because the scope of port 
operations was not as extensive as it is today. 
Ideally, port governance would include elements of both 
approaches, including national planning and local implementa-
tion, and both countries seem to be heading slowly in that di-
rection.  The U.S. is taking steps to establish a national frame-
work for marine transportation, in recognition of the fact that 
ports are not strictly local operations, but are integral to na-
tional economic and security goals.  In Canada, reforms that 
would give more local control, especially over the day-to-day 
business decisions made by ports, have been under considera-
tion for years.   
If port governance structures in the two countries con-
verge to similar models, perhaps the ports might tend toward 
cooperation, as well as competition.  As everything about in-
ternational trade becomes super-sized – cargo quantities, ships, 
the revenues involved, security needs, infrastructure require-
ments, traffic jams, and ports – some ports have been driven 
to consider multi-port cooperation in order to remain com-
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petitive.  The ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles jointly 
funded the Alameda Corridor, intended to improve rail and 
highway access to the two ports, and have taken joint action to 
implement an air pollution control plan.21  The port of Van-
couver and two nearby smaller ports, the Fraser River Port 
Authority and the North Fraser Port Authority, are consider-
ing creating a single Lower Mainland port entity in order to 
reduce the pressure on the port of Vancouver.22   
From a bird’s eye view, cooperation between the Puget 
Sound – Georgia Basin ports would make sense.  The ports of 
Seattle, Tacoma, and Vancouver all compete with the mega-
ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for West Coast busi-
ness.  If their container capacity were combined, the three 
Northwest ports would be almost as large as the port of Los 
Angeles.  They share advantages that could jointly be marketed 
to shippers, including deep water and the ports’ proximity to 
Asia (i.e., they are a day closer than the California ports).  They 
also share challenges, including traffic congestion, concern 
about air pollution, and a finite land base for future expansion, 
that might be addressed more rationally on a regional basis.   
Further, joint action by the ports might help to counter 
the growing power of shipping companies, which have con-
solidated to the point that the top seven container lines in the 
world own 50 percent of all vessel slots and the top twenty-
five own 84 percent.23  Port competition is a perpetual tension 
between ports and carriers, which place increasingly heavy de-
mands on ports.  Because the major carriers own such large 
market shares, while ports are fragmented and compete against 
each other, the carriers can push for deals that require ports to 
economize in locally harmful ways:  through lower labor costs, 
increased infrastructure invading hinterland neighborhoods, 
and a reluctance to require external costs such as pollution to 
be internalized by shippers.   
As long as port governance, taxes, and subsidies vary sig-
nificantly on opposite sides of the border, any concept of 
cross-border regional port planning or competition will be un-
thinkable.  Ports will focus on the other ports’ perceived ability 
to get a bigger piece of the pie, rather than determining 
whether the pie can be enlarged to benefit all.  However, if 
global trade reaches its projected magnitude over the course of 
the next several decades, the costs – economic and local – of 
each port’s individual race to meet the needs of the mega-
carriers may become too high.  In that case, the obscure details 
of port governance will help to determine whether the ports 
can adapt to global competition in ways that meet local needs, 
or whether the ports will become remnants of the commercial 
model that was in effect when their governance structures 
were adopted a century ago. 
 
 
* Jean Melious is an associate professor at the Huxley College 
of the Environment, Western Washington University. 
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